ABOUT ME
I completed my BA in philosophy at the University of Nottingham in 2015. I was awarded the Midlands3Cities Masters Studentship and completed my MA in 2016. I was then awarded the Midlands3Cities Doctoral Training Partnership to fund my PhD studies, which focused on adjudicating and advancing the debate between those who think physical disability is likely bad for a person's well-being (even if we discount the effects of discrimination against disabled people) and those who don't. My PhD was examined by Professor David Wasserman and Dr Zachary Hoskins in 2020 and I began teaching at King's High School in 2021. You can find my academic CV here and my social media at the top of the page. Please feel free to contact me on t.crawley@kingshighwarwick.co.uk
THOMAS CRAWLEY
I am a Philosophy and Theology teacher at King's High School, Warwick. I graduated with a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Nottingham in 2021. My thesis concerns the relationship between physical disability and well-being. I continue to read and write Philosophy in my spare time. I am interested in various ethical issues (including normative, applied and bioethics), social and political philosophy. My research was funded by the Arts Humanities Research Council's Midlands3Cities program.
PUBLICATIONS
Disability, Options and Well-Being
Published in Utilitas (2020)
Abstract: Many endorse the Bad-Difference View (BDV) of disability which says that disability makes one likely to be worse off even in the absence of discrimination against the disabled. Others defend the Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability which says that, discounting discrimination, disability does not make one likely to be worse (or better) off. A common motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a harm of disability. Some reject this argument, arguing that disabled people's prospects aren't hindered by having fewer options. In this article, I defend the Options Argument by arguing that, in disability cases, possessing a greater number of valuable options seems to overall improve well-being prospects. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and – although it doesn't establish the BDV – it lends plausibility to the BDV by identifying a potentially significant cost of disability.
What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?
Forthcoming in The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Abstract: The Bad-Difference View (BDV) of disability says, roughly, that disability makes one worse off. The Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability says, roughly, that it doesn’t. In recent work, Barnes – a MDV proponent – offers a detailed exposition of the MDV. No BDV proponent has done the same. While many thinkers make it clear that they endorse a BDV, they don’t carefully articulate their view. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the BDV. I argue that its best interpretation is probabilistic and comparative: it is the view that a person is likely to be, all things considered, worse off with a disability than without. As such, Barnes – who criticises the version of the BDV that disability by itself, intrinsically or automatically makes a person worse off – misses an opportunity to attack the most plausible and relevant version of the BDV, and the best version remains unchallenged.
PRESENTATIONS
Turku Moral Philosophy Seminar
University of Turku, November 28th 2019
'Disability, Options and Well-Being
Open Minds XIV
University of Manchester, 1-2 August 2019
'Disability, Options and Well-Being
European Conference of Ethics, Religion and Philosophy
Brighton, July 5-6 2019
'What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?' (later version)
International Conference on Ethics
University of Porto, June 19-21 2019
'What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?' (later version)
Reading Ethics and Political Philosophy Conference
University of Reading, June 12-13th 2018
'What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?' (early version)
Link UoN Graduate Conference
University of Nottingham, June 1st 2018
'What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?' (early version)
Internal Talks:
University of Nottingham Postgraduate Seminar
2020: 'Mere Difference and Assistive Technologies'
2019: ‘Mere-Difference or Bad-Difference: The Relevance of Testimony’
2018: ‘What is the Bad-Difference View of Disability?’ (early version)
2017: ‘”Now you know it, now you don’t (again)”: a problem for Epistemic Contextualism revived’
TEACHING
I find teaching extremely enjoyable. For me, it is one of the best parts of Philosophy. I enjoy discussing philosophical issues with students and am always looking to improve my teaching practice. I am an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (HEA) and was awarded the University of Nottingham Postgraduate Teaching Award in 2019. The feedback I receive from students and colleagues is generally extremely positive (see CV).
The Brilliant Club
2017-2021
I worked with the charity The Brilliant Club as a PhD tutor, designing and delivering a course on the Philosophy of Well-Being to year 10 students at Lancaster School in Leicester. You can find more information about The Brilliant Club and their project of reducing economic inequality in education here.
Teaching Affiliate -University of Nottingham
2017-2020
Various modules including:
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Reasoning, Argument and Logic (2019/20)
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Philosophy and the Contemporary World (2019/20 and 2018/19)
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Social Philosophy (2018/19)
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Contemporary Metaethics (2017/18)
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The Existence of God (2017/18)
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Introduction to Ethics (Autumn 2017/18)
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Applied Ethics (2016/17)
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Teacher of Philosophy and Theology - King's High School
2021 onwards
I teach Philosophy and Theology to students aged 11-18
Philosophy in Schools
2015
I taught philosophy in a Catholic primary school to children between 8 and 11. Topics included the meaning of life, artificial intelligence and the existence of god.